Don't give me that attitude!
Anti-*De Se* and Feature Matching of German D-Pronouns

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D-Pronouns in Attitude Clauses

DPros block co-reference with attitude holder: [1,2]

(1) *Donald$_d$* glaubt, dass { **er$_d$** /#**der$_d$** } klug ist.
    D. believes that he$_P$ he$_D$ smart is
    'Donald$_d$ believes that **he(PPro$_d$/#DPro$_d$)** is smart.'

Key Exceptions to be discussed here:

  (i) *de re* attitudes (= <u>anti-*de se*</u>) ➔ (7)-(8)
  (ii) attitude holder as DPro (= <u>feature matching</u>) ➔ (14)

➤ *proposed solution relies on expressive component of DPros*

Analogy with Epithets

DPros can add negative attitude towards referent [3]
(supposedly restricted to non-discriminating uses): [4]

(2) [*Trump$_t$* gave another speech at a rally.]
    { **Er$_t$** /**Der$_t$** } wollte eine Spaceforce einführen.
    he$_P$ he$_D$ wanted a space-force introduce
    '**He(PPro/DPro)** wanted to establish a space force.'

    asserted: Trump wanted to establish a space force.
    expressive (DPro): SPEAKER dislikes Trump

❖ *resembles epithets, which moreover pattern as in (1):* [5,6]

(3) #*Donald$_d$* thinks that [**the idiot**]$_d$ is smart.

Negative attitude has to hold in utterance situation: [7]

(4) [*continuation to (2) with DPro*]:
    …#aber heute find ich ihn$_t$ okay.
    but today find I him$_P$ okay
    …#but he$_t$'s alright today (because he took it back).

Implementation

  (i) negative attitude as definedness condition (projects)
  (ii) fixed evaluation time encoded via constant '@'

(5) **Lexical entry for epithet** [cf. 8]
    [[the idiot]]^{w,g} ≈ [[[*pro$_i$* [[the idiot] @]]]]^{w,g} =
    <u>SPEAKER has negative attitude towards g(i) in @</u> . g(i)

➤ *analogous treatment of DPro, with* d- *morpheme encoding expressive component (leaving aside other features):*

(6) **Lexical entry for DPro with expressive component**
    [[DPRO]]^{w,g} ≈ [[[d- @] PPRO$_i$]]^{w,g} =
    <u>SPEAKER has negative attitude towards g(i) in @</u> . g(i)

Deriving Anti-*De Se*

Co-reference licensed *de re*, but not *de se* (cf. epithets) [6]

(7) ***De Se* Context:**   <u>*d-pro in (1) unacceptable!*</u>
    Donald reads an old tweet of his, which
    he is impressed by, and says: "I'm really smart!"

(8) ***De Re* Context:**   <u>*d-pro in (1) acceptable!*</u>
    Donald reads a screenshot of a tweet with the author
    cut off, which he is impressed by, but does not realize it
    is his own. He says: "Whoever wrote this is smart!"

Assumptions on Semantics of Attitude Predicates [8]

– attitude predicates quantify over world-individual pairs
– belief world descriptions captured via concept generators
(9) [[think]]^{w,g} = [λΦ : λx: ∃G (= acquaintance based
    concept generator) for x in w s.t.
    ∀<w',y> ∈ Dox-Alt(x,w). Φ(G)(w')(y) = T]
– *de se*: co-variation of attitude holder with belief-counterpart
– *de re*: identification of referent via concept generator
– Lewisian theory of prohibition against trans-world identity

<u>1) *De se* blocked due to METAPHYSICAL CLASH</u>

❖ de se *predicates over counterparts in belief worlds,*
   but DPro-attitude holds only in actual world
   OF AN ARGUMENT THAT DOES NOT EXIST THERE:

(10) **simplified *de se*-LF:**
     [thinks [λG$_3$ [4 **[[@ d-] PPRO$_4$]** [is smart]…]

(11) ***de se* truth conditions for complement clause:**
     ∀<w',y> ∈ Dox-Alt(x,w) :
     <u>NEG-ATT(*spkr, y*) in @</u> . y is smart in w'

<u>2) *De re* allowed because DPro interpreted referentially</u>

❖ *since DPro is interpreted via concept generator rather than being bound, the DPro-attitude can be predicated of argument that exists in actual world, thus avoiding a clash:*

(12) ***de re*-LF:**
     [thinks [λG$_3$ **[[[@ d-] PPRO$_4$] G$_3$**] [is smart]…]

(13) ***de re* truth conditions for complement clause:**
     ∀<w',y> ∈ Dox-Alt(x,w) :
     <u>NEG-ATT(*spkr, Donald*) in @</u> . G(Donald) is smart in w'

Deriving Feature Matching

Co-reference licensed if attitude holder instantiated as DPro [9]

(14) *Der$_x$* glaubt, **der$_x$** kann das alles.
     he$_D$ believes he$_D$ can that all
     'He(DPro$_x$) believes that **he(DPro$_x$)** can do all of that.'

Epithet as attitude holder also able to license DPro [2]

(15) [*Dieser Idiot*]$_x$ glaubt, **der$_x$** kann mich öffentlich
     this idiot believes he$_D$ can me publicly
     beleidigen und sich dann Geld von mir leihen.
     offend and SELF then money from me borrow
     '[*That idiot*]$_x$ believes that **he(DPro$_x$)** can insult me in
     public and then borrow money from me.'

Proposal: analogous treatment to minimal pronouns: [10]

(16) I am the only one who did **my** homework.
     ➔ *my* can receive bound reading ("fake indexical")

❖ DPro born as minimal pronoun ∅ which receives a [D]-feature, borrowed from (6), from attitude holder:

(17) a. DPro$_{[D]}$[thinks[λG$_3$[4[∅[is smart]…]   **(Baseline)**
     b. DPro$_{[D]}$[thinks$_{[D]}$[λG$_3$[4[∅[is smart]…]   **Agree**
     c. DPro$_{[D]}$[thinks$_{[D]}$[λG$_{3[D]}$[4$_{[D]}$[∅[is smart]…]   **Pred.**
     d. DPro$_{[D]}$[thinks$_{[D]}$[λG$_{3[D]}$[4$_{[D]}$[∅$_{[D]}$[is smart]…]   **Binding**

Open Issues

- *What is the nature of [D]-feature? Is it [-LOG]?*
- *What about discriminating uses of DPro?*
- *What about other expressions with anti-logophoric flavor? Do they also involve an expressive component?*
- *Comparison with other accounts* [2,9]

References

[1] WILTSCHKO 1998; [2] HINTERWIMMER & BOSCH 2018; [3] BOSCH ET AL. 2007; [4] SICHEL & WILTSCHKO 2018; [5] DUBINSKY & HAMILTON 1998; [6] PATEL-GROSZ 2012; [7] POTTS 2007; [8] PERCUS & SAUERLAND 2003; [9] PATEL-GROSZ & GROSZ 2017; [10] KRATZER 2009